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HOW TO CONSTITUTIONALIZE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN
POLICY FOR THE BENEFIT OF
CIVIL SOCIETY?
Ernst- Ulrich Petersmann*
All societies have adopted rules in order to reconcile conflicts among
the short-term interests of their citizens with their common long-term
interests. All societies have learned that rule-making and rule-
enforcement require government powers, as well as "checks and
balances" against abuses of such powers. Constitutionalism has
emerged as the most important human invention for protecting equal
rights of the citizens against such abuses. It rests on the rationality of
Ulysses who, when approaching the island of the sirens and knowing of
their dangers, ordered his companions to bind him to the mast and not to
release him under any circumstances.' The underlying technique of "pre-
commitments" is based on the psychological insight that human
rationality is imperfect and exposed to short-term temptations (like the
songs of the sirens) that may be inconsistent with our long-term
interests (e.g., not being killed by the sirens). The self-limitation of our
freedom of action by rules and the self-imposition of institutional
constraints (like tying our hands to the mast) are rational responses
designed to protect us against future risks of our own passions and
imperfect rationality.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: A BRIEF SURVEY
Constitutionalism emerged in response to negative experiences with
abuses of political power in order to limit such abuses through rules and
institutions.2 Plato (427-347 B.C.E.), for instance, revised his earlier
recommendations in favour of philosopher kings in the light of his expe-
riences with the "thirty tyrants" in Athens; his theories of rule of law
and a "mixed constitution" (with monarchic, oligarchic and democratic
* Professor of Law at the University and the Graduate Institute of International Stud-
ies at Geneva. Former legal adviser in GATT and the WTO (1981-1997) and the German
Ministry of Economic Affairs (1978-1981).
1. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IR-
RATIONALITY (1979).
2. Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism, Constitutional Law and European
Integration, Swiss REV. OF INT'L ECON. REL. (Aussenwirtschaft) 247-80 (1991); AL.oIs RIK-
LIN, VOM SINN DER VERFASSUNG (1997).
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elements) were developed later in his unfinished last work, Laws, writ-
ten after his dangerous experiences with the tyrants at Syracuse in
Sicily.3 Plato's recommendation (in his Laws) to learn from a compara-
tive analysis of the then existing constitutions was carried out by his
disciple Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) who, in his Politics, searched for the
best form of constitution based on a comparative analysis of 158 city
constitutions;4 in addition, as tutor of the king's son (the later Alexander
the Great), Aristotle had practical experiences in politics. For him, man
was "an animal that naturally lives in a state" in order to have a "good
life."5 In his theory for the best mixed constitution, Aristotle introduced
the distinction between constitutions and post-constitutional laws that
must conform to the constitutional rules.6 However, the idea of a single
written constitutional document was developed much later.7 The first
constitutional referendum took place in Massachusetts in 1780, the first
constitutional convention was in Philadelphia in 1787 and the first
written constitutions in Europe were adopted in 1791 in Poland and
France. Today, almost all states have written national constitutions
(with the exception of Great Britain and New Zealand), which tend to
vary in content from country to country according to the particular his-
torical experiences, preferences and political circumstances.
Democratic participation in the setting-up and exercise of govern-
ment powers was another major political invention originating in the
city-republics of ancient Athens, even though electoral suffrage and the
right to vote were then limited to a minority of men and not extended to
women and the slave population. Universal suffrage was progressively
realized only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In contrast to the
direct participatory democracy in ancient Athens and, later on, in re-
publican Rome and in some of the Renaissance city-states of Italy, it
was the American model of representative democracy which has most
inspired the worldwide spread of democratic theory. For example, the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that
[e]veryone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives ....
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of gov-
emiment; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
3. PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO 136-74 (Thomas L. Pangle trans., Univ. of Chicago
Press 1988).
4. See T.A. Sinclair, Introduction to ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 13, 19 (T.A. Sinclair
trans., Penguin Books 1981).
5. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 59 (T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin Books 1981).
6. See id. at 277.
7. See, e.g., OLIVER CROMWELL, INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT (1654); JAMES HAR-
RINGTON, OCEANA (S.B. Liljegren ed., Carl Winters Universitatsbuchhandlung 1924) (1656).
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elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting proce-
dures.'
Yet, notwithstanding the progressive freeing of civil society since
World War II and the emerging worldwide right to democracy, effective
constitutional democracies exist in only about half of the 187 UN mem-
ber states.
Another major invention against abuses of political power was
Montesquieu's theory of the distribution and balancing of legislative,
executive and judicial powers so that power checks power9 A more dif-
ferentiated theory of separation of powers had been developed 200 years
earlier by Donato Gianotti (The Republic of Florence, 1534), based on
the distinction of four state functions (elections, legislation, judicial re-
view, foreign policy) and three decision-making phases (initiation of
proposals, deliberation and decision, execution). Even though his recog-
nition of the initiating and executive roles of government and of foreign
policy as an autonomous state function appears more realistic than does
the prevailing three-functions-model, Gianotti's book remained little
known due to its late publication in the eighteenth century and its trans-
lation into English only in 1990.' °
The limitation of all government powers by inalienable human
rights, as posited by John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government,
(1690)," was increasingly recognized in national laws following the
English, American and French revolutions and the English Habeas Cor-
pus Act of 1679. According to Locke, the only legitimate purpose of the
state is to protect the natural rights of the citizens. These rights precede
the state and are not conferred by governments on the citizens. Govern-
ments transgress their limited powers if they violate human rights, and
the injured citizens are entitled to resist such violations. 2 While Locke
focused on the human rights to life, liberty and property, the American
Declaration of Independence (1776) referred notably to the unalienable
rights to "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."'3 Following the
Virgina Bill of Rights (1776), the ten amendments to the U.S. Constitu-
8. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 21, A/RES/217A(III)
[hereinafter Declaration of Human Rights].
9. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 155-57 (Ann M. Cohler et al. eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
10. See, e.g., Alois Riklin, Introduction to DONATO GIANNOTTI, DIE REPUBLIK
FLORENZ (1534) 17 (Daniel Hochli trans., 1997); DONATO GIANNOTTI, REPUBLICA FIOREN-
TINA: A CRITICAL EDITION AND INTRODUCTION (Giovanni Silvano trans., 1990).
II. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 395-99 (Mentor 1965) (1690).
12. See id.
13. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, preamble (1776).
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tion (1789), the French "D6claration des droits de l'homme et du ci-
toyen" (1789), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the
increasing number of worldwide and regional human rights covenants,
and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by more
than 170 states at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, almost
all modern constitutions now include guarantees of human rights.
The legal protection of the weak for the enhancement of "social
justice" is a more recent principle recognized in modern national con-
stitutions. All societies have learned that neither economic markets nor
"political markets" are a guarantee for individual liberty, equality, and
social justice. Both private power as well as government powers risk
being abused for distorting market competition and for redistributing
income for the benefit of powerful group interests. In both economic
and political markets, undistorted competition and socially acceptable
results depend on rules that limit abuses of power and protect the weak
against poverty, exploitation and other "market failures." John Rawls'
Theory of Justice has demonstrated the possiblity of formulating general
"principles of justice" so as to supplement the "invisible hand of the
market" by the visible hand of the law. 4 All modern democracies have
introduced social legislation for the limitation of private freedoms and
property rights and for the collective supply of agreed "public goods" that
are not supplied spontaneously through private or political competition.
INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCTRINE:
LACK OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
From a citizen perspective, constitutionalism and its above-
mentioned "political inventions" are among the most important cultural
achievements for promoting peaceful cooperation among citizens. Just
as the globalization of both markets and competition have enhanced an
unprecedented spread of economic welfare to formerly less-developed
countries and societies since World War II, the spreading of liberal con-
stitutions has promoted rule of law and "democratic. peace" within and
among countries. Yet, this expansion has also made apparent the in-
creasing contradictions between the human rights premises of
democratic constitutions and the state-centered and power-oriented
premises of classical international law. Constitutional democracy aims
at the protection of individual freedom and equal rights of the citizens
and perceives individuals and democratic consent as the legitimate
sources of evaluating government policies and social processes (such as
14. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1973).
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market competition for the satisfaction of consumer preferences and
electoral processes as means for expressing individual interests). Tradi-
tional international law and the U.N. Charter, by contrast, focus on the
"sovereign equality of states" and recognize comprehensive powers of
the government (e.g., to represent the people in the U.N.) even if human
rights and democracy are not protected in the states concerned.'5
The European doctrine of international law was elaborated in the
seventeenth century, by writers such as Grotius and Pufendorf. 6 At the
same time the theory of the sovereign state was being developed by
Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes inferred from the state of nature, which he de-
scribed as "a war of every man against every man,"'7 the need for a
social contract among individuals to set up governments with unlimited
powers as a means of overcoming the anarchy in the state of nature and
securing peaceful order. Yet, for the international relations among
states, Hobbes did not seek to bring international anarchy to an end by
similar means, such as a social contract among sovereign rulers and by
setting-up an international Leviathan for ordering relations among
states. Hobbes, instead, focused on well-ordered internal sovereignty of
states without envisaging international agreements among sovereign
rulers so as to limit their external sovereignty and foreign policy pow-
ers.'" Political theory after Hobbes remained essentially state theory
focusing on the exercise of power within states.
According to Hobbes, the social contract established an absolute
authority of the sovereign with regard to his subjects, as it effectively
existed in most European states at that time. The sovereign rights were
indivisible, and the sovereign was the sole judge of the means to pre-
serve the peace and security of the commonwealth.' 9 In The Social
Contract (1762) of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 20 by contrast, sovereignty
was understood to belong to the people that formed the state. The social
15. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para 1; see also A. Bleckmann, Article 2(1), in THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 78 (Bruno Simma ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1994).
16. See, e.g., Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, in THE CLASSICS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAw No. 3, vol. 2 (James Brown Scott, ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon
Press 1925) (1625); Samuel Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations, in THE CLASSICS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW No. 17, vol. 2 (James Brown Scott, ed., C.H. Oldfather trans., Clar-
endon Press 1934) (1688).
17. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 185 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1981)
(1651).
18. See id. at 183-88; see also Jan-Erik Lane, International Organizations and Political
Theory: A Grotius-Hobbes Perspective, 53 Swiss REv. OF INT'L ECON. REL. (Aussen-
wirtschaft) 233, 237-42 (1998).
19. See HOBBES, supra note 16, at 228-39, 376-94.
20. See Jean-Jaques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY
LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU 169, 221-67 (Ernest Barker ed., 1960).
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contract established a republic and the submission by each individual to
the "general will" (as distinguished from the private will of all) through
which the community acted collectively so as to determine the public
interest and the laws limiting the civil liberties (as distinguished from
the natural liberty of the individual limited by the extent of his physical
power). While Rousseau conceived the sovereign power of the people to
legislate as inalienable, the executive powers were perceived as being
delegated to the government for the execution of the laws and the
maintenance of freedom in the state.'
Immanuel Kant shared Hobbes and Rousseau's view of law as a
precondition for the freedom of men in political society but inferred
from the innate right of men to freedom the necessity for universal laws
making the exercise of individual freedom consistent with the freedom
of all." While Kant followed Rousseau in legitimizing the state by the
idea of a social contract, "[Kant] went beyond Rousseau in allowing that
the legislative authority might be exercised by representatives acting on
behalf of the people.",2' Kant criticized Hobbes for having denied the
people their inalienable rights against the government, whose powers
should be limited by the rights of the citizens, by the separation of leg-
islative, executive and judicial powers and by the constitutional mandate
of maximizing the equal freedom of the individual citizens under the
rule of law." Kant recognized state sovereignty as the foundational
principle of international relations but inferred from his moral and legal
theory that all states should adopt a republican constitution designed to
protect the freedom and legal equality of their citizens.
In his seminal book on the law of nations De Jure Belli ac Pacis
(1625), Hugo Grotius distinguished the law of nature, the positive law
of nations based on the will of states, and the municipal law within
states. The law of nature was understood as principles of just conduct
among men whose validity was derived from human nature and dictates
of right reason independent of theological presuppositions. It served as
the foundation for the positive law of nations based on the will of states,
as well as for the municipal law brought into being by the civil power in
26the state. In marked contrast to Hobbes, according to whom states co-
existed in the state of natural freedom (i.e., continual "war of all against
21. See id.
22. See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 131, 132-
36 (Hans Reiss ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1971).
23. CHARLES COVELL, KANT AND THE LAW OF PEACE 54 (1998).
24. See Kant, supra note 20, at 138-47.
25. See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 20, at
99-102.
26. See Grotius, supra note 16.
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all") limited by the extent of their power, Grotius admitted that not only
individuals but also states obliged themselves through voluntary agree-
ments and basic rules of legal order based on principles of good faith.27
For Hobbes, by contrast, the law of nations was identical with the law of
nature which was binding on sovereign rulers only in conscience, with-
out being enforceable by a superior common power.2 In the period after
Grotius, international law doctrine could be subdivided into a naturalist
school of writers (like Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel) who saw interna-
tional law being based in universally valid principles of natural law,29
and a positivist school of writers who saw the law of nations as deriving
from the international treaty and customary practice of states.3" Wolff's
application of social contract theory to the international level, by deriv-
ing the source of voluntary international law from the idea of an
agreement among states to constitute a supreme civitas maxima with
joint law-making and law-enforcement powers for the promotion of the
common good of the nations,3' was not shared by most other writers
(like Vattel) who insisted on the sovereign equality of states and denied
that Europe (or the "Holy Roman Empire") was a single body-politic.
THE KANTIAN THEORY OF NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
Kant was the first political thinker who developed a comprehensive
theory of national and international constitutionalism based on the in-
sight that "the problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is
subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with
other states and cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved."33 In his
essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), 34 Kant elaborated a draft treaty be-
tween states with six preliminary and three definitive articles that he
considered to be essential for the realization of international peace on a
lasting basis.33 Like Hobbes, Kant regarded the natural condition of the
relations among men and states as a state of war. In order to institute
27. See HOBBES, supra note 17, at 185; Grotius, supra note 15, at 15.
28. See HOBBES, supra note 17, at 189-217.
29. See COVELL, supra note 23, at 80-100.
30. See id. at 81.
31. See id. at 82-86.
32. See id. at 86-93.
33. See Immanual Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 22, at 41, 47.
34. Kant, supra note 25.
35. See id.
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lasting peace, "all men who can at all influence one another must adhere
to some kind of civil constitution" of the three following types:
(1) a constitution based on the civil rights of individuals within
a nation (ius civitatis);
(2) a constitution based on the international rights of states in
their relationships with one another (ius gentium);
(3) a constitution based on cosmopolitan right, in so far as indi-
viduals and states, coexisting in an external relationship of
mutual influence, may be regarded as citizens of a universal
state of mankind (ius cosmopoliticum).
This classification, with respect to the idea of a perpetual peace,
is not arbitrary, but necessary. For if even one of the parties
were able to influence the others physically and yet itself re-
mained in a state of nature, there would be a risk of war, which
it is precisely the aim of the above articles to avoid.
3 6
Kant criticized "Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel and the rest" as "sorry
comforters... still dutifully quoted in justification of military aggres-
sion," whose "philosophically or diplomatically formulated codes do
not and cannot have the slightest legal force, since states as such are not
subject to a common external constraint."37 According to Kant, lasting
international peace could not be secured through international rules
based on state sovereignty and balance of power but required an inter-
locking system of national and international constitutional restraints for
a law-governed order rooted in principles of right and justice. The three
definitive articles of Kant's draft treaty of perpetual peace stipulated:
1. The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican.
2. The Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free
States.
3. Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Uni-
versal Hospitality.38
A republican constitution and a representative system were not only
necessary for protecting freedom and legal equality of the citizens; they
also offered the best prospect of attaining perpetual peace:
If, as is inevitably the case under this constitution, the consent
of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war is to be
36. Id. at 93, 98, 99.
37. Id. at 101.
38. Id. at 99.
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declared, it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in
embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean
calling on themselves all the miseries of war, such as doing the
fighting themselves, supplying the costs of the war from their
own resources, painfully making good the ensuing devastation,
and, as the crowning evil, having to take upon themselves a
burden of debt which will embitter peace itself and which can
never be paid off on account of the constant threat of new wars.
But under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and
which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in the
world to go to war. For the head of state is not a fellow citizen,
but the owner of the state, and a war will not force him to make
the slightest sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, pleasure pal-
aces and court festivals are concerned. He can thus decide on
war, without any significant reason, as a kind of amusement,
and unconcernedly leave it to the diplomatic corps (who are al-
ways ready for such purposes) to justify the war for the sake of
propriety."
Just like individuals and peoples had grouped themselves into na-
tion states so as to ensure freedom under the rule of law,
[e]ach nation, for the sake of its own security, can and ought to
demand of the others that they should enter along with it into a
constitution, similar to the civil one, within which the rights of
each could be secured. This would mean establishing a federa-
tion of peoples .... [Pleace can neither be inaugurated nor
secured without a general agreement between the nations; thus a
particular kind of league, which we might call a pacific federa-
tion, is required. It would differ from a peace treaty in that the
latter terminates one war, whereas the former would seek to end
all wars for good. This federation does not aim to acquire any
power like that of a state, but merely to preserve and secure the
freedom of each state in itself, along with that of the other con-
federated states .... It can be shown that this idea of
federalism, extending gradually to encompass all-states and thus
leading to perpetual peace, is practicable."
Kant's federalist conception of international law departed in im-
portant respects from the statist and power-oriented conception of
traditional international law doctrine:
39. Id. at 100.
40. Kant, supra note 25 at 102, 104 (emphasis in original).
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(1) Kant's proposals for international law, and for an "enduring
and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war,'
made no appeal to natural law.
(2) The national and international constitutional rules advocated
by Kant aimed at "perpetual peace" based in a rule of law
under which states would renunciate war as the means of set-
tling disputes over their rights; war would be justifiable only
as a means of self-defence against foreign aggression.42
(3) The "federation of free states" was conceived as a
"federation of peoples" with inalienable human rights and
constitutionally limited governments committed to rule-of-
law and to protection of citizen rights at home and abroad.43
National constitutional law was thus conceived as a neces-
sary part of the law establishing lasting international peace.
Due to Kant's conception of constitutionally limited states,
some of the international law principles proposed in the six
preliminary articles of his treaty of perpetual peace (such as
the right of self-determination and the principle of non-
intervention) went far beyond the classical international law
of coexistence.
(4) Kant's different view of sovereignty admitted the possibility
of a constitutional agreement among states to "form an inter-
national state (civitas gentium)," even though Kant
recognized that "this is not the will of the nations, according
to their present conception of international right,"" and that a
"world republic" risked being too large to provide effective
government and protection of equal rights.45 The proposed
federation of free states, by contrast, did not aim to acquire
any government power like that of a state.
(5) Kant's conception of constitutional rules and "cosmopolitan
rights" for citizens vis-A-vis foreign states as necessary pre-
conditions for perpetual peace anticipated the modern idea of
mutually beneficial integration law which, at least in postwar
Europe, has helped to bring about-in conformity with
Kant's conviction that "the spirit of commerce sooner or later
41. Id. at 105.
42. See id. at 104-05.
43. See id. at 103-05.
44. Id. at 105.
45. See COVELL, supra note 23, at 130-34 (emphasis added).
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takes hold of every people, and it cannot exist side by side
with war"" 6-an unprecedented period of peaceful interna-
tional cooperation and transnational "civil society."
(6) Kant's predictions of "democratic peace" among constitu-
tional democracies and of periodic wars in traditional
international law relations with non-democracies seem to
have been confirmed by experience over the past 200 years:
democracies have hardly ever waged war on each other and
are more willing to accept rule-oriented rather than power-
oriented conflict resolution methods.47
(7) Kant's ethical and legal conception of the individual as a ra-
tional being with moral autonomy who is entitled, under
national and international law, to respect as the bearer of
fundamental rights and equal freedoms, is based on a much
higher morality than the traditional treatment of the individ-
ual as mere object of the state-centered classical international
law.4
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
AS CONSTITUTION OF MANKIND?
Kant believed that, similar to the spontaneous promotion of division
of labor and welfare through the self-interested homo economicus and
market competition, the self-seeking inclinations of the homo politicus,
in his pursuit of freedom and social order in competition with other
societies, would likewise promote a progressive realization of constitu-
tional rules on republican self-government, cosmopolitan cooperation of
citizens and states, and thereby the free and full development of the
natural capacities of individuals. 9 Paradoxically, man's selfish tenden-
cies (his "unsocial sociability") would "become in the long run the
cause of a law-governed social order" and would also enable him to
46. Kant, supra note 25, at 114.
47. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, in DEBATING
THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 3 (Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 1996); Bruce Russett, The Facts
of Democratic Peace, in id. at 58; John M. Owen, How Liberalism Produces Democratic
Peace, in id. at 116.
48. See Kant, supra note 22, at 132-33.
49. See Kant, supra note 33, at 50 ("The history of the human race as a whole can be
regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally-and for
this purpose also externally-perfect political constitution as the only possible state within
which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely.") (emphasis in origi-
nal).
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solve finally also "the greatest problem for the human spe-
cies .... attaining a civil society which can administer justice
universally. 50 Do modern international law and the U.N. Charter offer
such a constitutional framework for cosmopolitan cooperation and per-
petual peace among legally free and equal citizens?
The concept of a "constitution" can be used in a broad sense for the
basic legal framework of a given human community which defines the
common rules for ensuring equal freedoms under the rule of law and
sets up institutions and decision-making processes for the making, ad-
ministration, and judicial enforcement of rules. International law can
thus be viewed as constitution of mankind.' The right of self-
determination of people, the sovereign equality of states, the principles
of non-use of force and non-intervention, the U.N. legal and institu-
tional framework for cooperation, and the modern human rights
guarantees whose universal nature is "beyond question" according to the
1993 Vienna Declaration52 can be seen as the most important constitu-
tional principles of modern international law. Certain "constitutional
problems"-for example, effective protection of human rights and mi-
norities, self-determination and self-responsibility of people, "states in
flux" and "failed states"-can be seen as problems not only of interna-
tional law (e.g., regarding the "right to development"), but also of many
national legal systems whose constitutional weaknesses undermine the
effectiveness of international law.
The term "constitution" is more often used in international law
doctrine and state practice in a narrower sense for international agree-
ments setting up international organizations, such as the "constitutions"
of the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agricultural Or-
ganization, and the World Health Organization. 3 Such "treaty
constitutions" define the basic rights and obligations of the member
states, regulate the international legal personality and accountability of
the organization, set up institutions, define their limited powers and de-
cision-making procedures, set out ratification, amendment and dispute
settlement procedures, and sometimes include "priority rules" so as to
ensure the consistency of "secondary treaty law" with the primary con-
stitutional rules. Even if the treaty text does not formally designate the
constitutive agreement as a "constitution," it is widely accepted that, for
50. Kant, supra note 25, at 44, 45.
51. See Christian Tomuschat, International Law as the Constitution of Mankind, in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: VIEWS FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 37-50 (1997).
52. See THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1945-1995,449 (1995).
53. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 1145-49 (1995).
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example, the U.N. Charter has the makings of a constitution for the
U.N. 4 Yet, notwithstanding the introductory words of the U.N. Charter
("We the Peoples of the United Nations ... have resolved to combine
our efforts . . . .""), the intergovernmental language and substance of
these constitutive agreements make clear that international "treaty con-
stitutions" for international organizations are very different from
constitutions for the rights and obligations of citizens and their govern-
ment in nation states. For example, human rights guarantees and
legislative, executive and judicial government functions tend to be pro-
vided much more comprehensively in national constitutions than in
internationally agreed constitutions of international organizations.
In both national law (especially in non-democracies) and interna-
tional law, nominal constitutions need to be distinguished from real
constitutions depending on whether the rules are effectively observed in
legal practice. In order to deserve their name, constitutions must effec-
tively constitute and limit citizen rights and government powers. It is in
this sense that Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen of 1789 declared that "a society where ... the separation of
powers [is not] established, has no constitution at all." 6 In a similar
vein, the Court of Justice of the European Community described the EC
as "a Community based on the rule of law, in as much as neither its
Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question
whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic
constitutional charter, the Treaty."57 Viewed from this perspective, it
seems difficult to conclude that international law and the U.N. Charter
effectively protect freedom and legal equality and provide constitutional
constraints on public and private abuses of power. For neither general
international law nor the U.N. Charter secures respect for the above-
mentioned constitutional principles, such as rule of law, separation of
powers, compulsory judicial review, democratic government, human
rights, or social justice. Also the U.N. human rights covenants of 1966
do not provide for compulsory judicial review and effective monitoring
and enforcement systems.58
54. See, e.g., James Crawford, The Charter of the United Nations as a Constitution, in
THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 3-16 (H. Fox ed., 1997).
55. U.N. CHARTER, preamble.
56. Declaration of the Rights of Man and the CitiZen, reprinted in COMPARING CONSTI-
TUTIONS 208, 210 (S.E. Finer et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1995) (1789).
57. Case 294/83, Les Verts, 1986 E.C.R. 1339.
58. For a detailed analysis of the monitoring systems of the U.N. human right conven-
tions, see, for example, THE MONITORING SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY OBLIGATIONS
(Eckart Klein ed., 1998).
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The statist focus of the U.N. Charter on "sovereign equality of all its
Members,"59 even though many U.N. member states continue to be to-
talitarian dictatorships, and the discriminatory Charter provisions in
favour of the victorious powers of World War II in the Security Coun-
cil, are also inconsistent with Kant's constitutional theory of a
federation of free and legally equal states with republican constitutions
and effective national and cosmopolitan human rights guarantees. Even
though the right of self-determination and basic democratic rights are
recognized in numerous U.N. human rights instruments, the U.N. has
not followed the Kantian recommendation of limiting membership to
constitutional republics that respect human and basic democratic rights,
such as those listed in Article 21 of the 1948 Universal Declaration on
Human Rights and in Articles 1 and 25 of the 1966 U.N. Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (e.g., "the right. .. to take part in the conduct
of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives, to
vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections ... by universal and
equal suffrage and ... by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression
of the will of the electors").60 In the Nicaragua Case of 1986, even the
International Court of Justice rejected the claim by the U.S. "that Nica-
ragua actually undertook a commitment to organize free elections,"
notwithstanding Nicaragua's membership in the U.N. Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights.6'
As Kant predicted, international aggressions and civil wars continue to
be regularly initiated by non-democratic U.N. member states. Lasting
peace cannot be effectively secured by power-oriented organizations
like the U.N.
THE EMERGENCE OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
A MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW?
The statist and power-oriented U.N. law contrasts with the emer-
gence of national and regional constitutional guarantees of freedom, rule
of law, and democracy throughout Western Europe following World
War II. After centuries of periodic wars, the newly emerging European
constitutional law has enabled an unprecedented period of "democratic
peace" in Western Europe. At the national level, most European postwar
constitutions include comprehensive guarantees of fundamental rights,
59. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para 1.
60. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 8; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 1, 25 A/Res/220 A(XXI) (1966).
61. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 131-32 (June 27);
see also JAMES CRAWFORD, DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1994).
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democracy, rule of law, and separation of powers.62 The authoritarian
Hobbesian belief in benevolent governments maximizing the public in-
terest, still characteristic of general international law (e.g., its
assumption that the head of state and minister for foreign affairs have
unlimited powers to bind the state for the future), has been replaced by a
constitutional attitude focusing on the protection of individual rights and
the limitation of government powers. Article 1 of the 1949 Basic Law of
Germany, for instance, reflects Kantian legal philosophy:
The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it
shall be the duty of all state authority. (2) The German people
therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights
as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the
world. (3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature,
the executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law.63
Article 2(1) prescribes the Kantian categorical imperative for
maximizing equal freedoms: "Everyone shall have the right to the free
development of his personality, in so far as he does not violate the rights
of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code.
' 4
Article 20 guarantees democracy, federalism, primacy of constitutional
law over legislation, separation of powers, and the Lockean right of "all
Germans ... to resist any person or persons seeking to abolish that con-
stitutional order, should no other remedy be possible., 65 The "eternity
clause" in Article 79 states: "Amendments of this Basic Law affecting
the division of the Federation into Laender, the participation on princi-
ple of the Laender in legislation, or the basic principles laid down in
Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.,
66
The German Basic Law is an example for liberal constitutional en-
trenchment in a country that has suffered from "constitutional failure"
and "government failure" more than most other countries had encoun-
tered. It illustrates that Kantian legal theory is practicable, even though
other, more stable European democracies may prefer their different
democratic traditions. The main message of postwar constitutionalism
in Western Europe remains the diversity of national constitutions, not-
withstanding their common core of principles of human rights,
democracy, rule of law, separation of powers, and social justice. The
most innovative feature of European constitutionalism is its meshing of
international and national guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination,
62. See, e.g., BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.
63. Id. art. 1.
64. Id. art. 2, para 1.
65. Id. art. 20, para 4.
66. Id. art. 79, para 3.
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rule of law, and judicial protection of individual rights, based on an ever
increasing number of regional treaties such as:
(1) The 1949 Statute of the Council of Europe and the 1950
European Convention on Human Rights (as amended), with
their comprehensive sustantive and procedural guarantees of
rule of law, fundamental rights, judicial protection and de-
mocracy."
(2) The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization which, similar
to the Kantian alliance of free states, limits membership to
democratic states.68
(3) The 1951 Paris Treaty and 1957 Rome Treaties (as amended)
which, according to the EC Court of Justice, constitute
"albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement,
nonetheless ... the constitutional charter of a Community
based on the rule of law" which has created a "new legal or-
der" for the benefit of which the states have limited their
sovereign rights in ever wider fields, and the legal subjects of
which are not only the member states but also their nation-
als.69
(4) The "Europe Agreements" concluded between the EC and all
Eastern European countries so as to establish free trade areas
based on rule of law, fundamental rights and "democracy
clauses," with the ultimate objective of preparing the acces-
sion of the Eastern European countries to the EC.7°
(5) The 1994 Agreement establishing the Organization for Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe, which also includes
guarantees of rule of law and peaceful settlement of disputes
by a European Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.7'
Today, it is firmly recognized in most of the forty member states of
the Council of Europe that the legal structure of the "European house" is
an interlocking layered system of national and international guarantees
of human rights, democracy, and rule of law which can be directly in-
67. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 10, 1949; Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950 (as amended).
68. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 10, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 244.
69. Opinion 1/91, Draft EC/EEA Agreement, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079.
70. See Marise Cremona, Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EC's Trade
Agreements, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAW 62-77 (Nicholas Emiliou &
David O'Keefe eds., 1996).
71. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Budapest Summit Declaration
on Genuine Partnership in a New Era, Dec. 6, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 764 (1995).
[Vol. 20:1
How to Constitutionalize International Law
voked and enforced by European citizens in national courts and in the
European Court of Human Rights (as reinforced by the 11 th Protocol to
the European Convention on Human Rights). This constitutional in-
sight-that cosmopolitan international guarantees of freedom, non-
discrimination, and rule of law can strengthen and extend corresponding
national legal guarantees of citizens also within their own countries vis-
a?-vis their own governments-goes far beyond Kant's draft treaty for
perpetual peace.7 2 The same is true for the supra-national principles of
EC law, such as its direct validity in-and legal primacy over-national
law, the "direct applicability" of precise and unconditional EC rules by
EC citizens, or the transnational "market freedoms" and fundamental
rights guarantees of EC law protected by the EC Court and national
courts for the benefit of the "citizens of the Union" " as well as foreign
citizens.
The U.N. human rights covenants and declarations adopt a rights-
based approach across the whole spectrum of civil, political, economic,
social, and cultural rights. The 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human
Rights recognizes that "all human rights are universal, indivisible and
interdependent and interrelated."74 Yet, the monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms of the U.N. covenants for economic, social, and cultural
rights are much weaker than those for civil and political rights. It is only
in the context of European integration law that transnational "market
freedoms" for movements of goods, services, persons, capital, and re-
lated payments have been fully recognized as transnational citizen rights
protected by national courts and the international EC and EFTA courts.
75
This transnational "cosmopolitan law" corresponds to the Kantian in-
sight that market freedoms are indispensable complementary conditions
of individual autonomy, self-determination, and peaceful cooperation
across frontiers. The cosmopolitan European integration law has en-
abled an unprecedented rules-based integration, proceeding from a
72. Cf Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Rights and Duties of States and Rights and Duties of
their Citizens, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FOR RUDOLF
BERNHARDT 1087-1128 (U.Beyerlin et al. eds., 1995).
73. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, 31 I.L.M. 253 (1992) art. 8, Feb.
7, 1992, [hereinafter EC Treaty].
74. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the World Conference on
Human Rights, supra note 49, at 448, 450.
75. On the often vague wording, relatively weak international monitoring mechanisms,
and frequent lack of domestic justiciability by national courts of international treaties on
economic and social rights, see Fons Coomans, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in
SIM SPECIAL No. 16, 41-51 (Netherland Institute of Human Rights 1995). On the often
weak impact of other UN human rights treaties in States' domestic legal and political orders,
see HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 725-
78 (1996).
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customs union among currently fifteen, and in a few years more than
twenty, countries to a common market, a monetary union and increas-
ingly also a political union.
The methods of the progressive constitutionalization of European
integration law offer important lessons for worldwide international law.
In both the law of the Council of Europe as well as in EC law, the inte-
gration processes were often advanced at the initiative of individuals
who invoked their fundamental rights in the European Convention on
Human Rights and in EC law before national and European courts. In
addition, these litigants brought about legal integration by protecting
their private interests through the rights recognized in the treaties.76 In-
tergovernmental complaints by member states were rare in the European
Court of Human Rights as well as in the EC and EFTA courts. The large
number of private complaints enabled the courts-as in the develop-
ment of many federal states-to construe the agreements among states
as constitutional charters with unwritten constitutional guarantees of
rule of law, fundamental rights, and democracy. The EC Court noted
that the objectives, the institutions, and the legislative, executive, and
judicial powers provided for in the EC Treaty go beyond those in other
agreements among states; yet, it was through a bold "constitutional ju-
risprudence" that the courts construed the EC Treaty in a rights-based
manner for the benefit of the citizens as having "direct effect,"
"supremacy," and conferring "directly applicable" individual rights on
EC citizens as subjects of EC law which the citizens could enforce in
national courts and the EC Court." The progressive "constit-
utionalization" of EC law was also influenced by international agreements
(notably the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the European
Convention on Human Rights) that were accepted by all EC member
states as an "integral part of the Community legal system" and served as
the legal framework for the progressive development of EC policies
(e.g., in the field of trade policy and human rights)., The constitutional
interpretations were periodically solidified by successive amendments
of the EC Treaty (such as the explicit guarantees of fundamental rights
76. See A.M. Burley & W. Mattli, Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal
Integration, in 47 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 41-76 (1993).
77. On the application and enforcement of EC law in the national courts of EC member
states, see the national reports, in THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND NATIONAL COURTS 1-224
(A.M. Slaughter et al. eds., 1998). On the judicial interpretation of the EC Treaty as a
"constitutional charter," and the "constitutional dialogues" between national judges and EC
judges, see A. Stone Sweet, Constitutional Dialogues in the EC, in id. at 305-30.
78. Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals for a New Constitution for the European Un-
ion: Building-Blocks for a Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Law of the EU, 32
COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1123-75 (1995).
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and democracy in Article F of the Maastricht Treaty) and Protocols to
the European Convention on Human Rights.
How TO CONSTITUTIONALIZE U.N. LAW?
LESSONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW REVOLUTION
At the ministerial meeting on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary
of GATT in 1998, governments celebrated the successful achievements
of GATT in liberalizing trade barriers and promoting trade, and eco-
nomic growth, in addition to freedom and rule of law in the 132 GATT
member countries and thirty one countries negotiating their accession to
the World Trade Organizaton (WTO). 79 But they also celebrated the re-
placement of the old "GATT 1947" by the 1994 Agreement establishing
the WTO which enabled it to adjust, extend, and "constitutionalize" the
world trading system in response to the new challenges of the globali-
zation of the world economy and of civil society. Many principles of the
WTO Agreement-such as its worldwide compulsory dispute settlement
system with appellate review, or the WTO membership of the EC and
other non-state actors (such as Hong Kong and Macao)-and the Uru-
guay Round approach to replacing the GATT 1947 by the WTO offer
important lessons for the needed reforms of the U.N. 0
The amendment procedures in Articles 108 and 109 of the U.N.
Charter make the entry into force of amendments of the U.N. Charter
for all 187 U.N. member states dependent upon ratification "in accor-
dance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the
Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members
of the Security Council.",8' As the permanent members are so far not
inclined to give up their privileged legal positions, and at least China
may veto Charter amendments aimed at strengthening fundamental
rights and democracy, most observers conclude that "there is no way
that the U.N. Charter could be fundamentally transformed, not to men-
tion replaced by an entirely new text., 82 Those who have abandoned the
idea of improving the current U.N. Charter because the many useful
79. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: 50
YEARS OF ACHIEVEMENT (1998); WTO Focus, (World Trade Org., Switzerland), May 1998.
80. For a detailed explanation of the following arguments, see Emst-Ulrich Petersmann,
How to Reform the United Nations: Lessons from the International Economic Law Revolu-
tion, 2 UCLA J. INT'L. & FOREIGN AFF. 183-185 (1997-98); Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, How
to Reform the UN System? Constitutionalism, International Law and International Organi-
zations, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 421-74 (1997).
81. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 108-09.
82. A NEW CHARTER FOR A WORLDWIDE ORGANIZATION? I (Maurice Bertrand & Daniel
Warner eds., 1997).
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proposals for piecemeal reforms cannot fundamentally change the out-
dated U.N. structures and recommend creating a new institution, have
not formulated practical proposals for overcoming the obstacles to re-
form: "no one says when and how such changes could come about."83
Does it need another world war for creating the political consensus on a
new U.N. for "perpetual peace?"
Rather than declaring intellectual bankruptcy vis-a-vis the greatest
challenge of international law and foreign policy, lawyers and policy-
makers should examine whether European integration law and the 1994
WTO Agreement, and their underlying Kantian legal theory, do not of-
fer promising models for reforming the U.N. system. The following six
experiences of national and international constitutionalism offer lessons
for the necessary reforms of U.N. law:
(1) For the reasons explained by Kantian legal theory, a new
U.N. must focus on protection of human rights and of
"democratic peace" through a "federation of free states."
The declared objectives of the U.N. Charter as stated in its
preamble-"to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations large and small,
and to establish conditions under which justice and respect
for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law can be maintained"4-can be realized
only to the extent that "we the peoples of the United Na-
tions"85 effectively enjoy human and democratic rights in
the member states of the U.N. Also EC law and WTO law
derive their democratic legitimacy not only from parlia-
mentary ratification of the EC and WTO agreements by
their member states, or from the welfare-increasing effects
of freedom of trade for all consumers, but also from their
treaty guarantees of transnational freedom and non-
discrimination among all member states and their citizens.
As explained by Kant, constitutional democracies and free-
dom of trade are indispensable building blocks for
perpetual peace and call for a new U.N. Charter based on
16human rights and cosmopolitan democracies.
83. Id. at 3.
84. U.N. CHARTER, preamble.
85. Id.
86. See Kant, supra note 25, at 99.
[Vol. 20:1
How to Constitutionalize International Law
(2) The compulsory judicial dispute settlement systems with
appellate review, in both EC law and WTO law, have en-
abled a much higher degree of rule of law than has been
possible in the U.N. framework. As Kant contended by ,
war as the natural condition of societies cannot be over-
come, neither among citizens nor among states, without
judicial procedures both for the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes and for the securing of rights.87 A new U.N. must
succeed in making the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
"the principal judicial organ of the United Nations '' 8  by
following the example of the EC and WTO treaties of
making membership conditional on acceptance of compul-
sory international jurisdiction.
(3) EC law and WTO law, and their comprehensive guarantees
of individual access to domestic courts, reflect another im-
portant Kantian idea: perpetual peace among states depends
less on rule-enforcement by international organizations than
on "self-enforcing constitutions" enabling citizens to protect
and enforce citizen rights and constitutional restraints.89
Following the model of the incorporation of fundamental
rights guarantees into EC law, and the incorporation of in-
tellectual property rights conventions into WTO law with
strengthened guarantees of access to national and interna-
tional dispute settlement and enforcement systems, a new
U.N. Charter should incorporate exisiting U.N. human
rights conventions and strengthen their judicial review
mechanisms at the national and international level.
(4) National and international constitutionalism must build on
the same principles and mutually reinforce each other
(following the "plywood principle"). EC and WTO law il-
lustrate that international guarantees of freedom and non-
discrimination can reinforce and extend corresponding na-
tional guarantees across frontiers: the non-discrimination
requirements of WTO law, for instance, by prohibiting dis-
crimination among the 132 WTO member states and their
citizens, take away more than 130 possibilities of govern-
ments to discriminate among their own citizens trading with
87. See Kant, supra note 22, at 137-38.
88. U.N. CHARTER, art. 92.
89. See Kant, supra note 33, at 45-47.
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other WTO countries. 90 The supra-national EC guarantees of
"direct effect," "primacy," and "direct applicability" of pre-
cise and unconditional EC rules in domestic legal systems
may go beyond what is acceptable or even desirable in
worldwide organizations. Yet, the WTO requirements for
"(e)ach Member (to) ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obliga-
tions," 9' and the periodic WTO monitoring of domestic
implementing legislation, can serve as an example of the
need for more effective monitoring and enforcement sys-
tems of a new U.N. vis-&t-vis domestic implementing
legislation.
(5) The WTO Agreement succeeded in overcoming the frag-
mented nature of the previous "GATT A la carte" system by
incorporating more than twenty worldwide agreements into
the WTO Agreement and by making WTO membership
conditional on acceptance of the agreements listed in An-
nexes 1 to 3.92 This "single undertaking approach" may also
be necessary for a new U.N. so as to enhance legal security
and make the ICJ the true principal judicial organ of the
United Nations. For the current situation, where less than a
third of U.N. members have accepted the compulsory juris-
diction of the ICJ, also appears due to the fact that, similar
to the old GATT legal system where many of the Tokyo
Round Agreements were accepted by only about one third
of GATT member countries, many agreements negotiated in
the U.N. framework are ratified by less than half of U.N.
member states. Integrating important U.N. agreements
(notably on human rights and humanitarian law) by means
of a "single agreement approach"-on the model of the
WTO Agreement with its annexed agreements on trade in
goods, services and intellectual property rights, and its nu-
merous references to other worldwide agreements like the
U.N. Charter, the IMF Agreement and other international
organizations and environmental agreements related to
90. See, e.g., ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1991) (regarding these
"constitutional functions" of EC and GAYI" law for limiting discretionary national govern-
ment powers to restrict freedom, discriminate, or redistribute income among their own
domestic citizens).
91. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, art. XVI:4,
33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
92. Id. art. 11:2.
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world trade-could extend the scope of application of U.N.
law and, by enhancing legal security, make judicial review
by the ICJ more predictable and more acceptable.
(6) Like the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreements, the 1945 U.N.
Charter, GATT 1947 or the 1994 WTO Agreement, a new
U.N. Charter will not come about without strong leadership
and political pressures from the U.S. and Europe. Yet, it of-
fers, no less progress and success than in the case of the
postwar agreements and of European integration. In order to
be politically acceptable, there is a need for a transitional
period during which, similar to the temporary coexistence
of GATT 1947 and the WTO, the new U.N. could coexist
with the U.N. 1945 so as to maintain orderly relations with
non-democracies. But in order to set sufficient incentives
for joining the new U.N., and disincentives against "free-
riding," the advantages of the new U.N. system, including
the financial and development assistance from the Bretton
Woods institutions, should be focused on the democracies
joining the new U.N., just as the advantages of WTO law
were not extended to member countries of GATT 1947 until
they acceded to the WTO.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS CONSTITUTIVE PART OF THE FOREIGN
POLICY CONSTITUTION: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
International law is not only an attempt at overcoming the Hobbe-
sian dilemma of international power politics and war among sovereign
states. It is no less necessary for constitutionalizing foreign policy and
maintaining the effectiveness of national constitutionalism. Foreign
policy powers are powers to tax and restrict domestic citizens (e.g.,
through import tariffs, trade restrictions or devaluation of the national
currency), to redistribute income among domestic groups (e.g., through
export subsidies and "tied" development aid), or to expose domestic
citizens to health risks and death (e.g., in case of war, peace-keeping and
peace-making missions, transnational environmental pollution). In a
globally integrated world, foreign policy and domestic policy are less
and less separable; almost all policies are shaped by, and must respond
to, local interests (e.g., of tax payers, importers and exporters) as well as
international integration (e.g., of world markets, communication sys-
tems, transnational pollution, immigration, international politics,
security). Without internationally agreed constitutional restraints on for-
Fall 19981
Michigan Journal of International Law
eign policy powers and a collective supply of international public goods
through international organizations, governments cannot maximize the
equal rights and public interest of their citizens in transnational relations
and the constitutional restraints on many domestic policy powers are
easy to circumvent. Rent-seeking interest groups know very well that
domestic citizens and members of parliaments are often "rationally ig-
norant" vis-ji-vis the exercise of foreign policy powers (e.g., the
thousands of tariffs on goods and services); and that redistribution of
income by means of foreign policy instruments (e.g., "protection rents"
due to administrative import protection) is often politically easier to
achieve than by means of domestic policy instruments (e.g., production
subsidies requiring parliamentary legislation).
National constitutionalism has long since neglected the special dif-
ficulties of constitutionalizing foreign policy powers which, in a world
composed of 200 states, are often exercised by means of international
agreements negotiated in secrecy, participation of "foreign policy ex-
perts" in non-transparent international organizations located abroad and
unilateral foreign policy measures in response to foreign acts of state.
As a result, national and international foreign policy bureaucracies
wield enormous discretionary powers which are often not effectively
controlled by national parliaments, national courts, or civil society. The
U.S. export control laws for "dual use goods," for instance, have been
largely applied since the expiry of the 1979 Export Administration Act
in 1990, on the basis of Executive Orders ("presidential legislation"),
without recognition of a constitutionally protected individual freedom to
export93 and often with only limited judicial review of the complex and
lengthy export licensing practices of the "jungle" of government agen-
cies involved. Montesquieu's theory of "distribution", "balancing" and
"separation" of powers assigned foreign policy to the Executive based
on the naive perception of foreign policy as execution of international
law.94 Yet, this constitutional function of international law is often ig-
93. U.S. courts have consistently denied an individual constitutional "right to trade with
foreign nations." See, e.g., Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 493 (1904); United States v.
Yoshida Int'l Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 580 (1975). Business asociations and academics, however,
claim that such a constitutional right-see, for example, SMALL BUSINESS EXPORTERS Ass'N,
EXPORTING: RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE? A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1994) CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND
INT'L STUDIES, BREAKING DOWN THE BARRICADES: REFORMING EXPORT CONTROLS TO IN-
CREASE U.S. COMPETITIVENESS 29-34 (1994)-is recognized-see U.S. CONST., Art. I, §9, cl. 6
("No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state")-and is not inconsistent with
the commerce powers of the U.S. Congress or the war powers of the Federal Government. See
Note, Constitutionality of Export Controls, 76 YALE L. J. 200, 202-03 (1966); cf Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, National Constitutions, Foreign Trade Policy and European Community Law, 3
EUR. J. INT'L L. I (1992)).
94. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 9, at 7-8, 156-57.
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nored by foreign policy-makers and rent-seekers who like to present
Machiavellian breaches of international law as political wisdom when-
ever they benefit from such foreign policy discretion. John Locke's
rights-based theory of constitutionally limited government was likewise
not extended to foreign policy powers because, in the words of Locke,
the latter are "much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing,
positive Laws,. . . and so must necessarily be left to the Prudence and
Wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public
good." Locke continued: 95
What is to be done in reference to Foreigners, depending much
upon their actions, and the variations of designs and interests,
must be left in great part to the Prudence of those who have this
power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their
Skill, for the advantage of the Commonwealth.96
Locke considered an "executive prerogative" for foreign policy as
inevitable because legislators can neither anticipate nor regulate all cir-
cumstances which may call for action. Moreover, domestic executive
powers and the foreign policy powers "are hardly to be separated, and
placed... in the hands of distinct persons;" "both of them requiring the
force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to place
(them) ... in distinct, and not subordinate hands, or... in persons that
might act separately .... which would be apt sometime or other to cause
disorder and ruine." 97 The Lockean dilemma of inadequate legal re-
straints on foreign policy powers ("primacy of foreign policy"), and
Locke's optimistic reliance on the "prudence and wisdom" of foreign
policy-makers notwithstanding centuries of wars and power politics in
international relations, were challenged by the Kantian theory of na-
tional and international constitutionalism. Yet, Kantian theory also fails
to offer precise answers to many problems of constitutionalizing foreign
policy powers through national and international legal constraints. For
instance:
(1) How to ensure more effective parliamentary and democratic
control of foreign policy powers without undermining the
rule of law? Like absolute monarchs at the time of Hobbes,
national parliaments often claim to stand above interna-
tional law. In the U.S., for instance, Congress asserts
constitutional power to pass legislation even if it is incon-
sistent with international law ("later in time doctrine"), and
95. LoCKE, supra note 11, at 411.
96. Id. at 412 (emphasis omitted).
97. Id.
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the U.S. Senate or Congress have occasionally made their
ratification of international treaties conditional on imple-
menting legislation inconsistent with international treaty
obligations negotiated by the Executive.9" The European
Parliament has no co-decision powers for international trade
agreements negotiated by the EC Commission and con-
cluded by the EC Council; it has likewise often consented
to implementing legislation inconsistent with international
law (e.g., GATT and WTO law).99 Such doctrines of
"parliamentary supremacy" risk to undermine not only the
international rule of law, but also the constitutional func-
tions of many international treaties to guarantees freedom
and non-discrimination beyond the scope of national laws."m
There is a need for stronger parliamentary participation in
the initiation, negotiation, and conclusion of international
treaties, as well as a need for taking into account the
"democratic functions" of many international treaties to
extend freedom, non-discrimination and rule of law in tran-
snational relations through reciprocal international
obligations beyond what governments are willing to grant
unilaterally to domestic and foreign citizens.
(2) How to ensure more effective judicial protection of the
transnational exercise of individual rights? In U.S. constitu-
tional law, the general safeguards of individual rights apply
in the conduct of foreign affairs as in domestic affairs.' '
Yet, private rights get comparatively short shrift by U.S.
courts in foreign affairs, for instance by declining
"standing," by exercising judicial deference to broad for-
eign policy discretion and claims of "public interest" (e.g.,
based on the "political question doctrine" or "act of state
doctrine"), or by denying individual rights altogether (e.g.,
98. See J.H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 329 (1992). For a criticism of this doctrine in U.S. law, see, for
example, Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 62-68
(1990).
99. See, e.g., I. MACLEOD, ET AL., THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES 98 (1996).
100. Cf Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Promote the International Rule of Law?
Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System, I J. INT'L EcON.
L. 25, 26-33 (1998).
101. See HENKIN, supra note 98, at 98-99.
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rights to import or export). 2 In the EC, the European Court
of Justice has never taken into account any of the more than
twenty-five GATT and WTO dispute settlement findings on
inconsistencies of EC law with GATT/WTO law; and there
is only one single recent judgment during the forty-five
years of the Court's existence which establishes a violation
of international law by the EC.' °3 The procedure in Article
173 of the EC Treaty for preliminary rulings by the EC
Court at the request of national courts has proven to be a
powerful instrument for promoting cooperation between
national and international courts in the judicial protection of
individual rights.'O° A more active use of the obligation rec-
ognized in most constitutional laws to construe domestic
law in conformity with international law would offer an-
other means for judicial strengthening of the rule of
international law. Given the reluctance in many countries to
recognize precise and unconditional international treaty
rules as "directly applicable" by domestic citizens without
reciprocity by other contracting parties, there is also a
strong case for negotiating reciprocal international require-
ments of "direct application" and judicial enforcement of
precise and unconditional treaty obligations in domestic le-
gal systems.
(3) How to prevent government executives from evading do-
mestic constitutional restraints through collusion in
intergovernmental organizations? The limited powers of the
European Parliament, and the feeling of many EC citizens
of not being effectively represented by such a distant multi-
national institution, illustrate the limits of transferring
systems of parliamentary representation to regional and
worldwide organizations. Many EC states have included in
their national constitutions new provisions strengthening the
control by national parliaments of the delegation of powers
to, and their exercise by, the EC and other international or-
ganizations. EC experience suggests that the Kantian
recommendation of clearly committing national and inter-
national institutions to the legal and judicial protection of
102. See. id. at 102-04; Fred L. Morrison & Robert E. Hudec, Judicial Protection of
Individual Rights under the Foreign Trade Laws of the United States, 8 NAT'L CONST. &
INT'L ECON. L. 91-133 (1993).
103. See Petersmann, supra note 100, at 29.
104. EC TREATY art. 173.
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equal rights of the citizens may offer the most effective
strategy for compensating the "democratic deficit" of inter-
national organizations. For, in the words of the EC Court,
"the vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their
rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the
supervision entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the dili-
gence of the Commission and of the Member States."'' 5 The
more transnational problems are collectively addressed in
international organizations, the more the constitutional
functions of international law and international organiza-
tions for an effective "foreign policy constitution" must be
taken into account.1'°
EC law offers the most advanced, albeit imperfect example for such
a foreign policy constitution based on complementary national and in-
ternational guarantees of fundamental rights, separation of powers,
judicial review, respect for international law, and active participation in
international organizations.' 7 From the point of view of citizens, the EC
operates, more than other international organizations, like a "fourth
branch of government" for the collective supply of public goods which
cannot be supplied by private markets or national governments alone.
EC law fully recognizes that the EC's external relations law and policy
need to be constitutionalized for the same reasons why EC law has lim-
ited the foreign policy powers of member states. The EC's common
commercial policy and monetary policy, for instance, are legally and
institutionally constrained by the following principles:
(1) Rights-based market integration: The EC Treaty prescribes
free movement of goods,' 8 persons,' °9 services,"0 capital and
payments,"' pursuant to the functional logic of "integration
from below." The rights-based approach sets incentives for
EC citizens to support the integration process by enforcing
their market freedoms through the courts against protec-
105. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
106. Cf Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism & International Organizations, 17
NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 398-469 (1997).
107. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Foreign Policy Constitution of the European
Union: A Kantian Perspective, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMAcKER, 433-47
(1996); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The External Powers of the Community and the Union:
Proposals for Protecting the Interests of EU Citizens Rather Than the Interests of EU Politi-
cians, in REFORMING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 265-77 (Vinter, et al. eds., 1995).
108. See ECTREATY arts. 9-37.
109. See id. arts. 48-58.
110. See id. arts. 59-66.
111. See id. art. 73.
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tionist restrictions. The 1992 European Union (EU) Treaty
prescibes respect for fundamental rights in all policy areas112
including foreign policy: like the EC Treaty provisions, for
example, on development cooperation,"3 the EU Treaty de-
fines the objectives of the common foreign and security
policy as "to develop and consolidate democracy and the
rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.""' "Human rights and democracy clauses" have
become a regular element of most cooperation agreements
concluded by the EC with third countries in Europe and the
.third world.
(2) Progressive policy integration vis-A-vis third countries:
The EC Treaty prescribes the progressive replacement of
national by common trade and monetary policies based on
Community powers of diplomatic representation, negotiation,
treaty-making, participation in international organizations,
* and unilateral regulation. "'
(3) International law as integral part of EC law: The EC Treaty
uses the international treaty obligations of EC member
states' 6 as legal basis for the internal and external trade and
monetary integration, and requires active participation of
the EC in relevant international organizations.'"7 The cus-
toms union law of the EC, for instance, is consequently
almost literally based on the GAT[ obligations of the EC
and its member states. International agreements concluded
* by the EC "shall be binding on the institutions of the Com-
munity and on Member States""' with legal primacy over
acts by the EC institutions and individual member states."9
(4) Institutional checks and balances: The quadripartite "single
institutional framework" and the new European Central
Bank System provide for horizontal and vertical separation
112. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, art. F, 31 I.L.M. 253 (1992)
[hereinafter TEU].
113. See EC TREATY art. 130u.
114. TEU art. J.1, para 2.
,115. See EC TREATY arts. 28, 105, 109, 113, 210, 228, 228a, 229.
116. See id. art. 9, 234 (using member states obligations under GATI and IMF law); id.
art. 228 (using member states EC obligations).
, 117. Id.,art. 229.
.118. Id. art. 228, para 7.
119. For a criticism of the nonetheless frequent violations of GATT and WTO law in
the context of the EC's trade and agricultural policies, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, May the
EC Violate International Law? (in German) 8 EUR. J. Bus. L. (EuZW) 325-31 (1997).
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and cooperation of EC institutions and decision-making
processes, restrained by direct citizen rights, for example, of
democratic participation and judicial review 20 (e.g., Articles
169, 173, 175, 177 EC). By prompting all member states to
set up independent national central banks and national com-
petition authorities, EC law has also contributed to the
institutional strengthening of domestic safeguards for the
protection of the equal rights of the citizens.
CONCLUSION
National and international constitutionalism are necessary condi-
tions for protecting human rights and "democratic peace" more
effectively across frontiers. Many U.N. human rights instruments, like
the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Action Programme of the U.N. World
Conference on Human Rights, now explicitly recognize the historical
experience of constitutionalism that human rights, democracy, separa-
tion of powers, rule of law, and market mechanisms serve
complementary functions: human rights can be effectively protected
only in democracies with separation and constitutional limitation of
government powers, rule of law, and market mechanisms that coordi-
nate private production and consumption in a decentralized manner with
due regard to consumer preferences. Like the U.S. constitution for na-
tional constitutionalism, the rights-based Kantian constitutional theory,
even though more than 200 years old, remains a challenge for the neces-
sary development of international constitutional restraints on
discretionary foreign policy powers. European integration law and WTO
law confirm the Kantian insight that rule of law requires compulsory
judicial protection of freedom and non-discrimination at home and
abroad. Parallel to the progressive extension of such guarantees through
European integration law and GATT/WTO law, the U.N. Charter needs
to be supplemented by a new U.N. constitution focusing on effective
protection of fundamental rights and constitutional democracies as pre-
conditions for lasting peace. The modern human rights revolution
enables states to base such reforms on positive international law, and
not only on Kant's moral imperative that the reason, moral autonomy,
and dignity of human beings require to secure and maximize equal hu-
man rights through national and international constitutional safeguards
of cosmopolitan democracy and lasting peace.
120. See, e.g., EC TREATY, arts. 169, 173, 175, 177.
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